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STATE TEACHER TENURE STATUTES: AN
APPEAL FOR REPEAL
Academic tenure allows teachers, after serving a probationary pe-
riod, to receive permanent employment, subject to dismissal only for
adequate cause and pursuant to certain procedural requirements. Ten-
ure has been the subject of much debate since its inception' and has
recently been attacked with renewed vigor.
Tenure effectively creates a permanent teaching staff with a very
slow turnover which makes entry into the market difficult.2 It therefore
operates to the disadvantage of young teachers and minorities who can-
not break into the profession because most jobs are already closed.
The most persuasive criticism of tenure is that it fosters, or at least shel-
ters, mediocrity. Whether due to a mistaken initial evaluation and
grant of tenure, a simple change in the teacher's attitude toward teach-
ing, a loss of energy or enthusiasm which may be brought about by age
or routine, or the tendency to do only what is necessary, most faculties
have a good deal of "deadwood" in their ranks.' Administrators, wish-
ing to take advantage of the current surplus of teachers and upgrade
their faculties, cannot rid themselves of employees who are not incom-
petent enough to be dismissed in a formal hearing4 but are not as quali-
fied as others seeking their positions. In addition, parent-taxpayers are
becoming more concerned about the quality of education that their
children receive and the quality of teachers that their tax dollars
support.5
The legislative priority is to provide the best possible education for
students. Although educational excellence and a teacher's satisfaction
with his job are not unrelated, the perpetuation of an individual
teacher's job security is a secondary concern which must yield if it is
incompatible with the primary goal. It is essential to remember this
priority when evaluating the merit of tenure. A system which promotes
teacher security while it impedes academic excellence reverses the leg-
islative priority. Both teachers who have dedicated themselves to the
professional responsibility of teaching and governing bodies should
discourage this system.
I. For various arguments pro and con, see COMMISSION ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE 14-16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FACULTY TENURE].
2. When this fact is taken together with presently decreasing enrollments which reduce the need
for teachers, the total number of available teaching positions is small indeed.
3. FACULTY TENURE, supra note 1, at 14.
4. See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text.
5. Additional pressure to do away with tenure may be exerted by parent-taxpayers because
recent attempts to hold educators accountable through educational malpractice suits have
been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440,
391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (1979).
19821 State Teacher Tenure Statutes
This note will examine state tenure statutes, their purposes, and the
effectiveness with which they further their purported goals in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions. Its primary focus is on tenure statutes
which apply to elementary and secondary school teachers,6 excluding
large metropolitan districts.7 Tenure in higher education and in large
metropolitan areas will be discussed only insofar as it helps the reader
understand basic concepts; both of these situations have special
problems associated with them.8 This note will also propose that legis-
latures repeal the present tenure statutes and replace them with the
model statute outlined below.9
Examination of Tenure Statutes
Numerous minor variations exist among the tenure statutes of dif-
ferent states. This note will therefore summarize only the basic points.
The typical tenure statute' ° has both substantive and procedural provi-
sions" which together make it very difficult to fire or not rehire a
teacher. 2 Teachers receive these protections after they have taught sat-
6. Most state tenure statutes apply only to elementary and secondary school teachers and this
note is directed toward those statutes. A few, however, apply to junior colleges. These, as
well as "quasi-statutory" tenure policies set forth in some state university faculty manuals,
are beyond the scope of this note.
7. Although "large metropolitan district" may carry different regional meanings, here it refers
to those districts where the problems mentioned in note 8 are most likely to arise.
8. Although tenure in higher education may be subject to some of the same criticisms as tenure
in lower levels of education, serious problems associated with academic freedom in higher
education place it beyond the scope of this note. See note 27 infra and accompanying text;
but see Olswang and Fantel, Tenure and Periodic Performance Review: Compatible Legal and
Administrative Principles, 7 J. COLL. & U.L. I (1981).
Large metropolitan areas are also excluded because their size may reduce the effective-
ness of the electoral process as a safeguard against tyrannical administrators. Poor working
parents may not be sufficiently able to keep abreast of their child's education, to know
whether teachers are performing adequately, and to put proper pressure on their elected
school board. Also, the huge number of administrators and teachers required to staff these
large districts may make it very difficult for the school board to have personal knowledge of
each teacher and administrator under it. Where this knowledge is lacking this electoral pro-
cess is unlikely to afford much protection. It is also possible that tenure is necessary to attract
teachers to teach in inner-city schools. See note 29 infra. Wisconsin may have a possible
solution. Teachers are hired on a purely contractual basis in all districts of the state with the
exception of the Milwaukee school district, which has a population of more than 500,000. In
that large metropolitan district, tenure statutes are deemed necessary due to the problems
stated above. See WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 118.21-.23 (West 1981).
9. See notes 68-74 infra and accompanying text.
10. This note distinguishes true tenure statutes which have both substantive and procedural ele-
ments, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.20.170 et. seq. (1975), from "fair dismissal laws" which
are basically procedural. Fair dismissal laws typically do not limit discharge to specifically
enumerated causes as do tenure statutes; basically any cause is permissible as long as it is not
unconstitutional. Their procedural requirements, however, closely resemble those found in
tenure statutes. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1264 et seq. (1980).
Of the fifty states, twenty-nine have statutes which could be classified as true tenure stat-
utes and ten seem to have fair dismissal laws allowing any cause which is offered in good
faith and is not unconstitutional. The remaining eleven states do not strictly conform to
either of these classifications. Of note are those which enumerate causes for dismissals dur-
ing the term of contract but not in cases involving nonrenewal of contracts. See, e.g., N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15-47-38 (1981).
II. See 68 Am. Jur. Schools § 151 (1973).
12. There are differences in procedural requirements between "dismissals" during a teacher's
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isfactorily in the same district for the requisite probationary period,
usually two to three years. 13
Once tenure has been granted, the teacher can be terminated only
for one of the substantive causes which the state enumerates. These
causes generally include the following: immorality, insubordination,
incompetence, neglect of duty, necessity to reduce the number of teach-
ers due to monetary crisis, and sometimes "other just cause.' 4 While
"incompetence" and "other just cause" might seem to strike at the dis-
ease of mediocrity, they frequently do not.'5 In Connecticut, for exam-
ple, the school board rarely brings a charge of incompetence because
the burden of proof is so onerous.' 6 In addition, the Iowa Supreme
Court's recent decision in Briggs v. Board of Directors,7 which in-
cluded mediocre performance in the definition of "just cause," drew
strong criticism because it did not require specific findings on the sub-
stantially detrimental effects which a tenured principal's mediocre per-
formance had on "lowered standards of instruction, lowered test scores
of pupils, lowered morale of students or faculty, or of any dissension
within the school."' 8 One cannot easily quantify the extent of damage
which a mediocre teacher does to a student or school system. An inor-
dinate amount of time and energy would be necessary to compile
enough evidence to establish conclusively a substantially detrimental
effect on education. Few school boards would find such an exercise
fruitful unless the teacher were grossly incompetent.
In addition to the difficulty of establishing substantive violations,
school boards must follow detailed procedural requirements of notice
and hearing. These procedural requirements are often very time-con-
suming, costly, and cumbersome."' For example, the Illinois tenure
term of contract and "terminations" after his contract has expired. See note 43 infra. How-
ever, these terms are used interchangeably in this note.
13. Probation periods may range as high as five years. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 168.104 (1982).
14. Only thirteen of the twenty-nine states which enumerate specific causes include the broader
category of "other just cause."
15. The Illinois statute allows dismissal if the interests of the schools require it. ILL. REV. STAT.,
ch. 122. § 10-22.4 (1977). Such discretion is subject only to provisions of the Teacher Tenure
Act, 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, 24-11 to 24-15 (1977). However, the "interests of the schools"
category is rarely used by itself and its repeal has been advocated. See Comment, A Question
of Remediability Standards of Conductfor Illinois Public School Teachers, 29 DEPAUL L.
REV. 523, 558 (1980).
16. Comment, Teacher Tenure in Connecticut.- Due Process Rights and "Do Process" Responsibili-
ties, 8 CONN. L. REV. 609, 702-03 (1976).
17. 282 N.w.2d 740 (Iowa 1979). The court stated:
IA] 'just cause' is one which directly or indirectly significantly and adversely affects
what must be the ultimate goal of every school system: high quality education for the
district's students . . . . It must include the concept that a school district is not mar-
ried to mediocrity but may dismiss personnel who are neither performing high quality
work nor improving in performance.
Id. at 743. See also COBB, AN INTRODUCTION TO EDUCATIONAL LAW, 51 (1981) which cites
E.C. BOLMEIER, THE SCHOCL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 194 (1973) as stating that "[s]chool
boards can demand of teachers only average qualifications, not the highest, in determining
incompetency."
18. Note, Contract Terminations of lowa Public School Teachers.- Considerations ofthe Substan-
tive Content of "Just Cause"for Termination, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 123, 131 n.52 (1980-1981).
19. See, e.g., Thurston, Tenured Teacher Dismissalin Illinois, 1975-1979, 69 ILL. B.J. 422, 422-23
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statute provides for an initial notification to a teacher, outlining his de-
ficiencies and allowing a reasonable amount of time to remedy them.20
This step is subject to review as to whether or not the amount of time
allotted was reasonable.2' If the reviewing officer decides that sufficient
time has elapsed, the school board may then vote to dismiss the
teacher. Once this happens, notice must be given stating the reasons
for dismissal; and, in large metropolitan areas or when the teacher re-
quests it, a hearing must be set.22 At the hearing, the school board has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
teacher is immoral, insubordinate, et cetera. A record of the proceed-
ings is made, and a hearing officer renders a decision. This decision is
subject to judicial review. 23 Therefore, it is possible to have two ad-
ministrative review proceedings in addition to the normal judicial ap-
peals process.
These broad substantive protections and cumbersome procedural
requirements make termination of all teachers very difficult. Thus, ten-
ure shields the mediocre and bad as well as the good teacher. Not only
does it shield the mediocre teacher, it may be in part responsible for his
being so. Many teachers who are secure in their employment and only
accountable when they become egregiously incompetent are tempted to
do only what they must.
The Historical Purposes of Tenure: Distinctions Between Higher and
Lower Education
Naturally, the tenure system had some merit or it would never have
been instituted. As this note will show, however, the historical pur-
poses of tenure are no longer effectively served in primary and secon-
dary public schools.
Tenure originated in higher education where its raison d'etre is both
the protection of academic freedom and the establishment of economic
(1981). The possibility of review on several levels makes it time-consuming: the expenditure
of school funds on attorney fees, hiring of substitutes for teachers who are testifying at hear-
ings, and reporting fees make it costly.
20. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 122, § 24-12 (1977). Several other states also require notification of
deficiencies. See, e.g., S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 13-43-1.1 (1975); S.C. CODE § 59-25-440
(1976).
21. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 131 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 82111. App. 3d
820, 403 N.E.2d 227 (1980); Thurston, supra note 19, at 423.
22. ILL. REV. STAT., ch.122, § 24-12 (1977) provides:
The teacher may be present with counsel and offer evidence . . . The board must
[issue subpoenas) at the teacher's request, but the teacher is limited to 10 subpoenas
A record of the proceedings is to be kept, and the board must employ a compe-
tent reporter to take notes of the testimony. The board and the teacher share the
reporting costs equally . . . Judicial review of the final administrative decision of the
board is governed by the Administrative Review Act. If the board's decision is re-
versed on review, the board must pay all the court costs.
23. Although judicial review is not available in some states, see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 342.930
(1979); most states provide for it. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.58.515 (1970).
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security.14 The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure25 states:
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) Freedom of teach-
ing and research and of extramural activities, and (2) A sufficient de-
gree of economic security to make the profession attractive to men and
21women of ability.
In higher education, academic freedom is an important motivation for
tenure. There it encompasses freedom in research, in publication, and
in teaching presentation. The type of information discussed in course
work at those levels is often controversial in a political or social sense,
or within the confines of the specific discipline. 27 Although difficult to
imagine in light of the current surplus of teachers, economic security
may also have a place in higher education. Higher paying jobs in the
business sector may affect a school's ability to attract teachers in profes-
sional schools and the sciences.
Subsequent to the acceptance of tenure in higher education, many
state legislatures provided for it statutorily in lower levels of education.
But, neither "academic freedom" in its pure sense as described above 28
nor "economic security," with the possible exception of large metropol-
itan areas,29 applies to lower education. Since few controversial sub-
jects are taught and the curriculum is well-defined, the elementary and
secondary schoolteacher, regardless of tenure, is fairly limited with re-
spect to curriculum and methodology.3 ° The courts have generally
shown a particular sensitivity to the delicate issues associated with the
distribution of control in these areas and have expressed their unwill-
24. For a detailed discussion of the history of academic tenure in America, see FACULTY TEN-
URE, supra note 1, at 93-159.
25. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure is a joint effort of the
American Association of University Professors and the American Association of Colleges
and is widely endorsed by colleges and universities. The full text is reprinted at 60 A.A.U.P.
Bull. 269 (1974).
26. Id., 60 A.A.U.P. Bull. at 270.
27. However, even in upper levels of education, recent Supreme Court decisions make tenure far
less important than it once was. The "right of academic freedom" as it concerns teachers has
assumed constitutional dimensions and has been protected as such in higher education since
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), where the Court said: "mere unorthodoxy
or dissent from the prevailing mores is not to be condemned. The absence of such voices
would be a symptom of grave illness in our society." Id. at 251. More recently, in Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Court reaffirmed its intention to protect academic freedom
and stated: "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'market-
place of ideas.' " Id. at 180.
28. Although a teacher's first amendment rights as a citizen are frequently included in the con-
cept of "academic freedom," these rights should be distinguished from "academic freedom"
in its pure sense where questions concerning the teacher's course content, presentation, and
freedom in research and publication are raised. See also Note, Cary, v. Board of Education.-
Academic Freedom at the High School Level, 57 DEN. L.J. 197 (1980).
29. See note 8 supra. There is some need to attract teachers to inner-city schools. However, the
simple guarantee of job perpetuation may attract many persons. Administrators justly wish
to avoid these candidates since they may rely on job security and perform minimally. Higher
salaries perhaps represent a stronger incentive for quality teachers to teach in the inner-city.
30. Tenure does not allow teachers to use unapproved methodologies or curriculum and teachers
who disregard the guidelines set forth by administrations in these areas may be subject to
dismissal for insubordination.
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ingness to enter those arenas.3 They have left the final decisions with
school administrators rather than individual teachers.32 This is under-
standable. Because of the compulsory nature of attendance and the
fact that students are in their formative years, both parents and the
school boards, in their role as parenspatriae, have superior claims to
those of individual teachers.While recognizing that "courts do not and cannot intervene in the
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school sys-
tems,"3 3 the Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas statute which
prohibited the teaching of evolution.34 In so doing, it declared that
courts "have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our
educational systems where essential to safeguard the fundamental val-
ues of freedom of speech and inquiry and belief."35 The Court also
intervened in the area of course content in Meyer v. Nebraska.36 In
reversing the conviction of a teacher who had taught German in viola-
tion of state law, the Court stated that the due process clause protects
against arbitrary restrictions on the freedom of teachers to teach and
students to learn.37 Interestingly, the foregoing discussion reveals that
when protection is afforded academic freedom in lower levels of educa-
tion, courts rather than tenure statutes have provided it.38
Because of the difficulty in defending tenure in primary and secon-
dary schools on grounds similar to those adopted in higher education,
tenure statutes reflect a somewhat different purpose in lower education.
The immediate goal, there, is often stated as the provision of stability
within the teaching profession by assurance of continued service to ex-
perienced teachers rather than subjection to dismissals based on polit-
ical or arbitrary reasons. 39 Thus, tenure supposedly prevents political
and arbitrary factors from influencing decisions of whether or not to
retain a teacher. This, in turn, should create a situation whereby teach-
ers are retained on merit rather than external factors-undoubtedly a
desirable occurrence.
The primary purpose of tenure in lower education is or at least
should be "merit-based" retention of teachers and not simple job per-
31. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980)
(curriculum); Beebee v. Haslett Public Schools, 406 Mich. 224, 278 N.W.2d 37 (1979)
(methodology).
32. Although distribution of control over curriculum between parents and school boards has
generated much litigation, it is unlikely that individual teachers will be given that preroga-
tive. See generally Orleans, Jhat Johnny Can't Read "'Firsi Amendment Rights"in the Class-
room, 10 J. L. & EDUC. 1 (1981), and Comment, Zykan v. Warsaw Community School
Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980), 50 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 188 (1981).
33. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
34. Id. at 109.
35. Id.
36. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
37. Id. at 400.
38. Tenure statutes probably would not have prevented the dismissals in Meyer and in Epperson
since these teachers violated state laws which would constitute "cause" under many tenure
statutes.
39. See, e.g., Donahoo v. Board of Educ., 413 I11. 422, 425, 109 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1952).
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petuation which results in stability. Any argument which proposes a
direct relationship between stability in the faculty and excellence of ed-
ucation is unrealistic. Although one teacher with many years of experi-
ence may be excellent, another with the same experience may be very
poor because he has lost his enthusiasm. There simply is no direct
correlation.4°
Current tenure statutes are not the best means of attaining merit-
based retention of teachers. Many of tenure's protections inhibit that
goal because they promote the entrenchment of mediocre teachers.4 1
Almost all of those protections, which actually further merit-based re-
tention, are already adequately protected. 42 The few additional tenure
protections which further merit-based retention 43 may be achieved
through less drastic measures" than present tenure statutes with their
concomitant problems.45
Judicial Protections
In Shelton v. Tucker,46 the Supreme Court of the United States
stated that "[tlhe vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is no-
where more vital than in the community of American schools. 47 In
keeping with that statement, the Court has clearly indicated its intent to
protect the first amendment rights of teachers regardless of tenure.48
Although these rights are not absolute, the state must show a compel-
ling state interest in placing restrictions on them.49
Accordingly, the Court has held that a teacher's freedoms of associ-
ation and belief are shielded from legislative as well as school board
interference. Statutes requiring political disclaimer oaths and bans on
membership in certain political organizations have been held to be un-
40. Statutory provisions for reduction in force (R.I.F.) which require that teachers be retained on
the basis of seniority should also be repealed since they bear no relation to competency.
41. See notes 14-23 supra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 46-60 infra and accompanying text.
43. Dismissal of a teacher during his contract term deprives him of a property interest which
triggers the fourteenth amendment's notice and hearing requirements regardless of tenure.
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). However, tenure does buttress the guaran-
tee of procedural due process in cases of nonrenewal where the teacher is not tenured and his
contract has expired. In those instances, tenure or some clearly implied promise of continued
employment provides the necessary "property" interest without which notice and hearing are
not constitutionally required. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972).
44. See notes 83-87 infra and accompanying text.
45. Not only does tenure promote the entrenchment of the mediocre, it blocks the job market for
younger and minority teachers, and most importantly, dulls the quality of education for the
youth of this country.
46. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
47. Id. at 487.
48. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 595, 598 (1972) the Court stated that "the nonrenewal of a
nontenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be predicated on his exercise
of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights."
49. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (where the Court established
a test balancing the teacher's interest as a citizen in making public comment against the
State's interest in promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its
employees).
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constitutional grounds for teacher dismissals.5" In Keyishian v. Board of
Regents,5 a teacher's failure to sign a certificate stating that he was not
a Communist resulted in the nonrenewal of his one-year teaching con-
tract. The Court held this to be a violation of Keyishian's first amend-
ment rights, stating that "[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to
safeguarding academic freedom. . .[which is] a special concern of the
First Amendment, [and] which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom."52
The Court has also explicitly indicated its intention to protect free-
dom of speech. In Pickering v. Board of Education,"' the Court upheld
a teacher's freedom of speech and refused to allow the school board to
dismiss him for publicly criticizing the board's handling of financial
matters even though his criticisms were based on incorrect information.
While recognizing that harmony within the teaching staff and good
working relations between an employer and employee may be legiti-
mate state interests,54 the Court held that this kind of criticism does not
jeopardize those interests. In so holding, the Court established a strict
rule:
Absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him,
a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance
may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.55
Thus, according to Pickering, the Constitution protects a teacher's free-
dom to speak on issues of public importance unless it has a direct dis-
ruptive impact on the employment relationship. 6 The Court has since
expanded this rule to include private speech. In Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School Dist.," statements made in private encounters
50. Questions concerning freedom of association, as it pertains to the rights of homosexual
teachers, are still hotly debated. In such situations, tenure should not be employed as a
means of enforcing moral standards. In any event, constitutional issues regarding the bal-
ance of a teacher's fights against parent and state interests in the child's education supersede
tenure. Despite the existence of tenure statutes, teachers have been and will probably con-
tinue to be dismissed. For a general discussion of this problem, see Note, Free Speech Rights
of Homosexual Teachers, 80 COLUMBiA L. REV. 1513 (1980).
51. 385 U.S..589 (1967).
52. Id. at 603.
53. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
54. The Court explained its exception for speech causing a disruptive impact as follows:
The statements [were] in no way directed towards any person with whom apellant
would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher. Tnus no
question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among
coworkers is presented here. Appellant's employment relationships with the Board
... are not the kind of close working relationships for which it can persuasively be
claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper
functioning.
Id. at 569-70.
55. ld. at 574.
56. See notes 61-66 infra and accompanying text.
57. 439 U.S. 410 (1979). Under Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the
board could have dismissed Ms. Givhan only if it had proven that its decision to terminate
her would have been made in the absence of her private encounters with the principal. Jus-
tice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, stated his belief that, in light of the evidence, the
school board could not have met this burden of proof. 439 U.S. at 418. See also Note, First
1982]
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with a school principal were deemed impermissible grounds for
dismissal.
In addition to concerns over first amendment rights, fears of dismis-
sal because of political patronage have been expressed.58 However real
these fears may have been in the past when many of the present tenure
statutes were first enacted, they are now unfounded. The Supreme
Court's decision in Elrod v. Burns59 makes it clear that dismissals of
teachers based on political patronage are unconstitutional.'
The Court's decision in Pickering seems to leave a loophole--that
of the disruptive impact on the employment relationship. This issue
must be briefly examined for it is an area where simple bad feelings
between a teacher and principal or administrator could become a rea-
son for dismissal. Imagine the worst scenario: a ruthless and incompe-
tent principal recommends the termination of a very competent teacher
because he has offered constructive criticism of the principal. This
recomendation is accepted by an incompetent superintendent and
board who neither know of, nor care about, the teacher's competence
or the principal's incompetence. Assuming the absence of tenure and
that the principal recommended termination after the teacher's contract
had expired; 61 the teacher would be unjustly discharged. This unlikely
scenario of incompetence at every level of administration would allow
individual injustices to occur.
Several factors militate against such an occurrence. It is uncertain
whether simple constructive criticism will be viewed as sufficient aggra-
vation to constitute a "disruptive" impact on the employment relation-
ship.62 Two recent Supreme Court decisions have also reduced the
likelihood of malicious or arbitrary dismissals. The Court held in
Wood v. Strickland6 3 that individual administrators and school board
members are "persons" under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871. 4 As such, they are subject to personal liability for their actions
which are in violation of well-settled law. Presumably, the possibility
of personal liability would make even the most unscrupulous adminis-
trator think twice before arbitrarily dismissing a teacher. The Court
has also ruled that school boards as entities may be sued under section
Amendment Rights-Public Employees May Speak a Little Evii-Givhan . Western Line Con-
solidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979), 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 289 (1981).
58. Sinowitz, WhatAbout Teacher Tenure?, N.E.A.J. 40, 41 (April 1973).
59. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
60. Id. at 393.
61. See note 43 supra. If a hearing had been required, the board's decision would probably have
been reversed. A teacher willing to continue working in this unpleasant environment might
be reinstated. A teacher unwilling to continue would be monetarily compensated. The
model statute set forth below attempts to deal with this problem. See note 69 infra.
62. The Court left open the case of "disruptive" impacts in Pickering; it did not feel that Mr.
Pickering's letter fell within that category even though the letter included false criticisms of
his employer. 391 U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968).
63. 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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1983.65 Taxpayers are unlikely to reelect board members who, by their
wrongful actions, have jeopardized the finances of the school district.
Thus, the election process should also guard against the prospect of
incompetency at all levels of administration and decrease the possibil-
ity of individual injustices.66
MODEL STATUTE
Because existing tenure statutes pertaining to elementary and secon-
dary school teachers no longer serve the historical reasons for their cre-
ation, in part due to recent judicial decisions, and in part because their
language is ill-defined and their procedures excessively cumbersome,
legislatures should repeal them. Due to certain potential problems fac-
ing the good teacher, legislatures ought to pass a statute which has as its
goal academic excellence based on merit-retention of teachers.
The foregoing discussion suggests that a legislature must balance
two basic interests when drawing up a statute governing the employ-
ment of teachers. The first and most important interest is that of the
state in providing students with the best possible education. The sec-
ond interest which should be protected is that of the individual teacher
to merit-based retention.
The following statute furthers those ends. It allows school boards
more easily to dismiss unmotivated and tired teachers and to replace
them with others who are energetic and dedicated. At the same time, it
grants substantive protections against arbitrary and purely economic
67
dismissals, both of which obstruct merit-based retention. It also at-
tempts to prevent the complacency which occasionally turns energetic
teachers into dull teachers.
The Statute6
8
1. This is not a tenure statute and does not create any expectancy of
continued employment. It grants only the limited procedural pro-
65. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
66. Reliance on the election process to produce a system of accountability has the added advan-
tage of correcting deficiencies throughout the different administrative levels. Elected boards,
dependent on support from parent-constituents, would be pressured into appointing consci-
entious superintendents who would keep informed about the competency of both teachers
and principals under their control. Such a system is preferable to tenure's statutory morality
which is, at best, a "Band-Aid" approach.
67. See Sinowitz, supra note 58.
68. This model statute is meant to be only skeletal in form. The disparity in the structure of
different school systems and in the delegated powers of administrators dictates this. In
addition, the model is a composite of several different statutes and many of its provisions are
already present in more detail in existing statutes. See, e.g., note 75 infra.
In states where tenure statutes provide a contractual relationship between the teacher and
state, prospective application of the model statute may be necessary since retroactive
application may violate the contract clause of Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution. See United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17-32 (1977). In states where there is no
contractual relationship, retroactive application would be permissible. See COBB, supra note
17, at 40.
Although the terms such as "principal," "superintendent," and "school board" are widely
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tections which are explicitly set forth.6 9
2. All teachers shall be hired on an annual contractual basis.
3. Yearly evaluations shall be made.70 These shall include:
a. principal evaluations of teachers," and
b. teacher evaluations of the principal.72
4. Recommendations for teacher dismissals or nonrenewal of their
contracts shall be made by the principal. This recommendation
must include the specific charges against the teacher. These rec-
ommendations shall be transferred, along with all yearly evalua-
tions, to the superintendent. If the superintendent decides to affirm
that recomendation based on his personal knowledge and the eval-
uations, he shall send those evaluations and his comments to the
school board for final determination.
5. The school board shall not base a decision of nonrenewal of a
teacher's contract on the following:
a. any constitutionally impermissible grounds, or
b. arbitrary or capricious grounds, not reasonably related to im-
provement of the quality of education provided students, or
7 3
c. purely economical grounds, without regard to teaching ability
and job performance.7 4
6. Notice of nonrenewal shall be given to all teachers for whom the
board has made a decision of nonrenewal. This notice shall be
timely75 given and shall state the specific reasons for the decision.
7. A hearing shall be granted when requested.7 6 The hearing shall be
conducted before a hearing officer who does not reside in the dis-
trict involved. The hearing officer will be chosen in the following
way. The state board of education will sufply the local board and
teacher with a list of five neutral officers. Each party will alter-
accepted, some states do not use them. It is assumed that these states will substitute their
own terminology accordingly.
69. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 156-58 (1974), and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343-
47 (1976), which allow limited procedural protections which do not amount to a cognizable
"liberty" or "property" interest under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
70. A principal recommending termination at the end of a teacher's first year should, of course,
make his evaluation prior to the end of that year so that notice may be timely filed and the
teacher may look elsewhere for employment.
71. Some states have already provided teacher evaluation procedures. Eg., S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 1343-9.1 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-537 (Supp. 1981).
72. Where teacher evaluations of their immediate supervisor are made, possible problems arising
in the supervisor's competence rather than the teacher's competence may surface. The super-
intendent or school board would then be in a better position to make an informed decision
regarding the teacher's dismissal.
73. "Reduction in force," accomplished on the basis of merit rather than seniority, would not
constitute "arbitrary" termination. See note 40 supra.
74. This provision is not meant to prohibit (R.I.F.). See note 33 supra. Here, however, since
merit is not in question, seniority should prevail.
75. Most states already define "timely notice" and require that it be given two months or more
prior to termination.
76. See note 61 supra.
77. Although some states do not require that the hearing officer be a non-board member, see
Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Assn., 426 U.S. 482, 497 (1976)(where the Court in determining whether, as a member of the board, the hearing officer was
neutral, stated: "[there is a] presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with deci-
sionmaking power."). It would appear more fair if the hearing officer were chosen as out-
lined here. However, this procedure may not be possible in some states where issues of
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nately strike one name and the remaining officer will conduct the
hearing.
8. Both parties may be present with counsel at the hearing and may
present evidence. The teacher has the burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that nonrenewal was based on imper-
missible grounds as set forth in § 5 (a-c).
9. The hearing officer's decision may be appealed in the judicial
courts of this state.7 If the school board's decision is reversed on
review, it must pay all court costs and attorney fees.
Flexibility for School Boards and Their Appointed Administrators
Several sections of the statute provide added flexibility for school
boards and their appointed administrators. Sections one and two effec-
tively substitute the continuous employment of teachers presently sup-
plied by tenure statutes with a system based on yearly contracts.
79
These provisions require teachers to remain competitive in the job mar-
ket and should allow administrators to seek out and hire the most com-
petent teachers available.
At first glance this might seem to imply perpetual and disconcerting
turnover in the ranks of teachers. However, experience in the business
world shows this is not likely. The employer and management sectors
have a natural bias in favor of retaining the "known entity," if that
person is competent and dependable. Continual hiring and firing is not
in the interest of management (principal and superintendent) or em-
ployer (school board) since it inhibits the smooth operation of a school.
In addition, most people who work together develop certain bonds of
friendship and understanding which also inhibit a continual hiring and
firing policy.
The substantive and procedural protections presently encountered
under tenure statutes make it difficult to discharge a teacher.8" Sections
five and eight of the model statute strike at those provisions and greatly
ease that difficulty.
Section five represents the converse of the corresponding substan-
tive provisions of tenure statutes. It enumerates specific grounds for
which dismissals are forbidden and implies that all others are permissi-
ble.8' Contrary to existing tenure statutes, it presumes honesty and in-
tegrity in public elected officials and gives school boards needed
flexibility to upgrade their faculties.
Section eight shifts the burden of proof from the school board to the
municipal sovereignty would prohibit relinquishment of control over hiring and firing to the
state.
78. Judicial review may not be feasible in all states. A few must leave the final decision with the
school board. See note 77 supra.
79. See note 69 supra.
80. See notes 15-23 supra and accompanying text.
81. Tenure statutes enumerate grounds for which dismissals are permitted and thereby imply
that others are not.
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teacher. a2 Although placing the burden of proof on the teacher may
appear harsh, it is mitigated by the following. First, the dismissal no-
tice which the school board issues to the teacher must be specific in its
statement of reasons. Secondly, when the decision to dismiss has been
reached, it has been arrived at by the mutual examination of principal,
superintendent, and school board, based on a study of all evaluations
of both teacher and principal. The statute presumes that the joint deci-
sion of a number of people should receive more weight than the indi-
vidual teacher's self-appraisal.
These provisions should decrease the number of hearings and pro-
mote only genuine challenges to the school board's decisions. Thus,
school boards should no longer be deterred from making legitimate de-
cisions to dismiss teachers because of the prospect of a costly and time-
consuming hearing.
Protections for Teachers
The second goal of this statute is to provide certain protections for
teachers so that merit-based retention is promoted. Although it is im-
possible to entirely eliminate subjectivity from decisions to renew a
teacher's contract, this statute can diminish it. 3
The evaluation procedures of sections three and four should mini-
mize the likelihood of arbitrary or malicious dismissals.8 4 Both super-
intendents and school boards will be less likely to rely solely on a
principal's recommendation if that recommendation does not coincide
with evidence in the evaluations before them.85
In the absence of any statute, teachers would be employed, like
most other salaried employees, at the will of their employer, the school
board. This would mean that a teacher could be fired when his con-
tract expired without being given notice or a hearing.86 Although the
business sector works smoothly under this process, few would object to
a notice requirement.87 Therefore, section six provides for timely no-
tice which states specific reasons for the decision of nonrenewal. Such
82. This structure parallels that set forth in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977). In that case, a teacher claimed that he was terminated because of conduct which was
constitutionally protected. The Court held that the teacher had the burden of proving that
his conduct was indeed protected and represented a substantial motivating factor in the
board's decision to fire him. Once this was shown, the burden would shift to the board to
show that, absent that protected speech, it would have made the same decision. Id. at 284-
87; see note 57 supra.
83. With or without tenure, there is no real check on the subjective way in which teachers are
hired. In light of this, tenure would serve to make it difficult for later administrations to
terminate an employee who was not initially hired on the basis of merit.
84. These evaluations promote thoughtful decisionmaking and thus prevent innocent as well as
arbitrary errors.
85. See also notes 63-66 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 43 supra.
87. Only serious charges such as immorality would infringe upon a teacher's "liberty" interest
and require a hearing. This should not unduly burden administrations since few of these
charges are filed. Indeed, notice requirements benefit school boards by fostering trust and
confidence and also by precluding claims of arbitrariness made by terminated employees.
[Vol. 9:144
State Teacher Tenure Statutes
notice will not burden administrators for they must already know the
reasons for their decision and need only state them. As Justice Mar-
shall said in his dissent in Roth:
[Ilt is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist. . . As long
as the government has a good reason for its actions it need not fear
disclosure. It is only where the government acts improperly that proce-
dural due process is truly burdensome. And that is precisely when it is
most necessary.8
8
Not only will this notice provision aid teachers by rendering arbitrary
actions more difficult, it will also help them in preparing their case
against the decision, if indeed it was arbitrarily made. Once specific
charges are stated, they are more easily refuted.
Sections five (b) and nine also provide protection against frivolous
termination proceedings. Section five (b) explicitly prohibits arbitrary
dismissals and requires a hearing when a teacher claims that the
board's decision was arbitrary. Section nine provides that the school
board pay court costs and attorney fees if its decision to terminate a
teacher is reversed on review. 9
Unlike fair dismissal laws,' this statute does not require a teacher
to have served a set number of years before its protections apply. All
teachers should be free from arbitrary dismissals and there seems to be
no compelling reason to differentiate between them according to their
length of employment.
Proponents of tenure frequently claim that tenure is necessary to
prevent purely economical dismissals.9 ' Such dismissals are contrary
to merit-based retention and should be avoided. While dismissals on a
purely economic basis might be acceptable in some sectors of the busi-
nessworld, since the goal there is often simply to produce a good and
cheap product, it is not the view of this note that education itself can be
given a cost/efficiency price tag like that of a manufactured object.
The talent of a good teacher to inspire students cannot be so simply
quantified as the cost/efficiency of producing a car. Therefore, it
would not be in the long-range interest of academic excellence to fire
one teacher who is meritorious and has worked ten years in the system
in favor of another teacher who is also meritorious but has worked only
two years and is drawing a much lower salary. This would inevitably
produce an unhealthy psychological climate among teachers and would
be a serious detriment to the quality of education, where so much of
that quality depends upon the individual teacher's psychological verve.
The specific problem of purely economic dismissals which is de-
tailed above is addressed in section five (c). Ideally, administrators
would not dismiss a highly competent teacher for this reason. Yet, con-
88. 408 U.S. at 591.
89. See note 44 supra.
90. See note 10 supra.
91. See Sinowitz, supra note 58.
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ctrns over budgetary cuts may make it difficult even for conscientious
administrators to resist doing so and hiring another qualified teacher at
a much lower salary. It seems, therefore, preferable to prevent this sit-
uation by statutory means.
Accountability
The final goal of this statute is the prevention of complacency which
often turns good teachers into mediocre teachers. Annual evaluations
will keep the teacher apprised of his performance level, and an annual
contract will keep him accountable for the quality of his teaching. This
system of accountability rather than job security requires teachers to
stand on their merit. It therefore promotes quality educators and quali-
ty education.
CONCLUSION
The increasing disenchantment with tenure and its weakened posi-
tion due to recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that state legisla-
tures will be called upon with greater frequency to reevaluate their
tenure statutes. States have a duty to provide their youth with the best
quality of education they can. The professed purpose of tenure stat-
utes, improvement of state school systems, is in keeping with this duty.
However, existing statutes, rather than improving school systems, have
a tendency to perpetuate mediocrity. These statutes should be re-
pealed. A statute similar to the above model will improve the educa-
tional system and serve the dual function of allowing school boards to
upgrade their faculties while maintaining basic fairness for teachers.
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